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CHOICE OF LAW IN TORTS: THE NEW RULE
J.P. McEvoy*
Following release of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jensen v. Tolofson and Lucas 
v. Gagnon,1 lawyers across Canada scrambled to accept or withdraw outstanding 
settlement offers in actions involving torts and the Conflict of Laws. The 
connecting factor of combined lex fori/lex loci delicti, last affirmed by the Supreme 
Court almost 50 years ago in McLean v. Pettigrew,2 was rejected to the surprise 
of no one. But, to the surprise of many, so was the American revolution in choice 
of law. Instead, the Court turned to the very connecting factor that the American 
revolutionaries sought to displace, lex loci delicti.
Background
The locus classicus of the lex fori/lex loci delicti rule for choice of law in torts is 
the 1870 decision of Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre? In words destined to be 
construed as if contained in a statute, Willes J. stated a general rule of double civil 
actionability premised on two conditions -  that the matter be (i) actionable by the 
law of the forum, and (ii) not justifiable by the lex delicti.4 Problems soon arose. 
Was this a rule of choice of law or jurisdiction? Subsequent cases clearly 
determined, whatever may have been the intention of Willes J., that Phillips 
established a rule of choice of law in favour of the substantive law of the forum.
Machado v. Fontes5 modified the Phillips rule by interpreting the “not 
justifiable” condition as meaning “not innocent”. In Machado, the presumably 
forum-seeking Brazilian plaintiff was permitted to sue the Brazilian defendant in 
England for defamation published in Brazil, notwithstanding that there was no civil 
liability for defamation in Brazil. The court determined that the act was “not 
innocent” as defamation was subject to criminal liability in Brazil. As this case 
illustrates, to satisfy the “not innocent” condition the plaintiff merely had to 
demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct constituted a criminal or quasi-criminal
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1[1995] 1 W.W.R. 609, [1994] S.CJ. No. 110 (QL) [hereinafter Tolofson cited to W.W.R.].
2[1945] S.C.R. 62, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65 [hereinafter McLean cited to S.C.R.].
3(1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 (Ex. Ch.) [hereinafter Phillips]. Phillips brought an action in England against 
Governor Eyre for a false imprisonment alleged to have occurred during a rebellion in Jamaica. The 
Governor successfully defended the action because an Act of Indemnity, enacted by the Jamaican 
legislature, “declared lawful and confirmed” the acts of the Governor in quelling the rebellion.
4Ibid. at 28-29: “As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged to have
been committed abroad, two conditions must be filled. First, the wrong must be of such character that
it would have been actionable if committed in England ... Secondly, the act must not have been 
justifiable by the law of the place where it was done.”
offence under the law of the locus delicti. This rule, developed in a simpler time, 
proved a very useful device for plaintiffs in the modem regulatory world and 
provided obvious advantages to the motor vehicle accident plaintiff.6
The Supreme Court of Canada applied this Phillips/Machado choice of law 
rule in McLean? In McLean, a gratuitous passenger, resident in Québec, brought 
an action in Québec against her driver, also a Québec resident, for injuries 
sustained in a single vehicle accident in Ontario. Ordinary delictual responsibility 
under the law of the forum, Québec, satisfied the first branch of the Phillips rule. 
The problem before the Court was the gratuitous passenger law of Ontario, the 
law of the place of the tort, under which a gratuitous passenger had no cause of 
action against her driver.8 Taschereau J., for a majority of the Court,9 held that, 
notwithstanding his actual acquittal on a charge of driving without due care and 
attention, the defendant driver had in fact committed that offence and, accordingly, 
his conduct was “not innocent” within the meaning of the Machado gloss on 
Phillips.
For almost 50 years McLean was the final word of the Supreme Court on the 
issue. During this period, academics and judges were not silent.
The Road Not Taken
Critics of the traditional choice of law rules in torts were not hard to find. In 
England, J.H.C. Morris, drawing upon the concept of the proper law of the 
contract, suggested the connecting factor of the proper law of the tort — the proper 
law being the law with the most significant connection to the parties and the
is important to note that the effect of satisfying the two branches of the Phillips/Machado rule is 
to apply the law of the forum as the choice of law in tort. In other words, the two branch connecting 
factor points to the substantive law of the forum. A successful plaintiff must overcome not only all 
defences under the law of the forum but also all absolute defences under the law of the place where 
the act was done -  only absolute defences would make the act justifiable by that law. Stated another 
way, a defendant has the advantage of all defences available under the law of the forum but also all 
absolute defences under the law of the place where the act was done. In considering this rule, it must 
be remembered that it is the plaintiff who selects the forum in which to litigate and therefore has 
control over the defences available to the defendant.
1 Supra note 2.
8Highway Traffic Act, R .S .0 .1937, s. 47(2).
9Rinfret CJ.G, and Hudson and Estey JJ. concurring. Kellock J. delivered separate concurring 
reasons. (Hudson J. expressly reserved his concurrence from the contractual liability analysis of 
Taschereau J.).
conduct in relation to the particular legal issue in dispute.10 Though not well 
received in England, the concept flourished in the United States.
In the United States, the American Restatement11 rule of the place of the 
wrong {lex loci delicti) came under severe criticism. Based on the vested rights 
theory, the place of the wrong was defined as the state where the last event 
necessary to make an actor liable in tort took place.12 Was justice achieved with 
such a rule? What of the purely fortuitous place of the wrong; for example, an 
airplane crash? Why should the law of the place where the airplane crashed 
govern tort claims of passengers from a multitude of states — a true multi-state 
tort. Or, what of motor vehicle accidents in state A involving plaintiffs and 
defendants from state B. Why should issues of compensation be determined by 
the law of the place of the accident (state A) rather than that of the state of both 
parties (state B), a state truly interested in the proper compensation of its citizens 
for conduct occasioned by another of its citizens? And, what of cases of negligent 
manufacture of goods in state A, but the injury occuring in state B? Where is the 
place of the tort to be localized?
In response, a number of revolutionary approaches were suggested, many 
criticized as pro-plaintiff and pro-recovery biased. David Cavers, a principal 
proponent of rule-seeking rules,13 focused on combinations of higher and lower 
standards of conduct and compensation in five relevant contact states — the state 
of acting, the state of injury, the home states of the plaintiff and defendant, and 
the state in which the relationship between the parties has its “seat” — to develop 
five “principles of preference” to identify the preferred result in choice of law in 
tort cases.14
10See J.H.C Morris, ‘Torts in the Conflict of Laws” (1949) 12 Modem L.R. 248 at 252. See also 
J.H.C Morris, “The Proper Law of a Tort” (1951) 64 Harvard L.R. 881.
“American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws (St. Paul: American Law 
Institute Publishers, 1934) at § 377 et seq [hereinafter First Restatement].
12Ibid.
13See D.F. Cavers, “A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem” (1933) 47 Harvard L.R. 173 at 194; 
P.M. North and JJ. Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law, 12th ed. (London: 
Butterworths, 1992) at 31-34; J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 
1994) at 30-32.
14Cavers, The Choice of Law Process (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1965) at 139 as quoted 
in Castel, ibid. at 42-44. For example, if the state of injury set a higher standard of conduct or 
compensation, Cavers favoured application of the law of the state of injury over the state of acting, 
even if the defendant acted in his or her home state. However, if the state of injury and the state of 
acting are the same state and that state sets a lower standard of conduct or compensation than the 
home state of the injured plaintiff, Cavers favoured application of the lower standard.
Brainerd Currie’s offering to the choice of law revolution was government 
interest analysis.13 This approach focuses on the policy interests of conflicting 
states in applying their own law to the legal issue in dispute. Currie found that 
many conflicts were false conflicts — those that upon closer examination revealed 
that a state did not have an interest in having its law apply — thereby leaving the 
applicable substantive law to the one state with a real policy interest. For 
example, a state where a motor vehicle accident occurred involving non-residents 
only, would have no real interest in applying its law to issues of compensation 
between the parties. Or, the laws of the interested states may be found to be 
identical and, therefore, not in conflict. Currie had a problem when resolving a 
real conflict of interested states. In his view, a court could not properly decide 
between two conflicting interested states. The best solution to this conundrum was 
to apply the law of the forum, which, of course, would favour forum shopping. A 
valuable refinement to Currie’s work was made by William Baxter who contributed 
the theory of comparative impairment to resolve Currie’s dilemma of the true 
conflict.16 Under comparative impairment, a court would weigh the respective 
interests of the states concerned and apply the law of the state most impaired by 
the non-application of its law.
Of less significance, in terms of broad acceptance, is the contribution of 
Robert A. Leflar. Leflar reduced the basic policy considerations of a conflicts 
system to five factors: “A. Predictability of results; B. Maintenance of interstate 
and international order; C. Simplification of the judicial task; D. Advancement of 
the forum’s governmental interests; E. Application of the better rule of law.”17 
This approach creates a flexible analytical framework which leads in many cases 
to the application of the law of the forum.
The most influential approach is that adopted by the American Law Institute’s 
Restatement of the Law Second, Conflict of Laws 2d.1* The Restatement Second, 
adopted in 1969, rejected the vested rights theory of the First Restatement in favour 
of a policy-driven approach in which particular issues are governed by the proper 
law, or the law of the state with the “most significant relationship to the 
occurrence and the parties”. The determination of the proper law is to be 
informed by seven policies reflecting the basic objectives of a system of Conflict
15B. Currie, “Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws” (1963) 
63 Col. L. Rev 1233.
16W.F. Baxter, “Choice of Law and the Federal System” (1963-64) 16 Stan. L. R. 1.
17RA. Leflar, “Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law” (1966) 41 N.Y. U. L.R. 267 at 282. 
Examples of courts applying the Leflar approach are Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (1966) and Roy v. 
Star Chopper Co. Inc. 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978).
18(St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers, 1971) [hereinafter Restatement Second\.
of Laws.19 Fortunately, the drafters of the Restatement Second applied their 
policy approach and identified the resultant connecting factors in the various areas 
of law. In relation to torts, the drafters further identified four key contacts to be 
considered in determining the law with the most significant relationship: the place 
of injury, the place of acting; the domicil, residence, nationality and place of 
business of the parties; and the place where the relationship between the parties 
is centred.20 Finally, the drafters also applied the policy objectives and the key 
contacts to determine that the choice of law rule governing personal injuries is 
“the local law of the state where the injury occurred ... unless, with respect to the 
particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship ... to the 
occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be 
applied”.21
Accordingly, after all the innovation, the drafters retained lex loci delicti as the 
principal choice of law rule, though subject to the very important exception in 
favour of the law of some other more significant state. It would not be unfair, 
though perhaps a bit simplistic, to view the Restatement Second as an amalgam of 
lex delicti, Cavers’ principles of preference, Currie’s interest analysis and the basic 
policy objectives of a conflicts system.
What then is the choice of law rule in tort in the United States? The answer, 
it would seem, is that there is a diversity of rules rather than a predominant or 
majority rule. A 1993 survey22 of choice of law rules in tort revealed the
19Ibid. at § 6:
[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the form,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states 
in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and,
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
These policy considerations reflect in large measure the work of Yntema, “The Objectives of Private 
International Law” (1957) 35 Can Bar Rev. 721; Cheatham and Reese, “Choice of the Applicable 
Law” (1952) 52 Col. L. Rev. 909; and Reese, “Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second!” (1963) 
28 Law and Contemp. Prob. 679.
xIbid. at § 145(2).
21Ibid. at § 146.
22See S.C Symeonides, “Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1993 (and in the Six Previous 
Years)” (1994) 42 Am. J. of Comp. Law 599. For a 1987 survey, see G.E. Smith “Choice of Law in 
the United States” (1987) 38 The Hastings LJ. 1041.
following statistics: thirteen states follow the First Restatement rule of lex delicti; 
twenty-two, the Restatement Second; one, a centre of gravity or significant contacts 
approach; two, interest analysis; five, Leflar’s policy considerations; two, the lex 
fori; and five, a combination of various approaches including Caver’s principles of 
preference and modified interest analysis.
The Judicial Road
In Boys v. Chaplin,23 the House of Lords rejected the proper law of the tort, but 
recognized that the Phillips/Machado choice of law rule required modification. 
The action concerned a motor scooter/car collision in Malta involving two British 
soldiers. Under the law of Malta, the plaintiff was limited to special damages of 
£53, but the law of England, the forum, permitted additional recovery of £2250 in 
general damages. The Law Lords delivered five separate reasons for decision 
resulting in the view that no true ratio can be discerned from these varied 
reasons.24 Notwithstanding that view, Boys has been interpreted as declaring a
In terms of the three key elements of plaintiff, defendant and place of the tort, four classic fact 
patterns logically arise in relation to motor vehicle accidents: (i) the plaintiff, defendant and place of 
the tort are localized in three different countries (1-2-3); (ii) the plaintiff is injured in his or her 
country of residence by the conduct of a visiting defendant (1-2-1); (iii) the visiting plaintiff is injured 
by the conduct of a defendant acting within the defendant’s country of residence (1-2-2); and (iv) 
visiting plaintiff and visiting defendant, both of whom are residents of the same country, are involved 
in tortious activity in a second country (1-1-2). A general and crude consideration of American case- 
law points to a rule of thumb of 2 out of 3. In other words, when applying any of the modem 
American approaches, the appropriate choice of law is the law of that country identified «lien 2 out 
of the 3 elements of plaintiff, defendant and place of the tort are localized in the same country. This 
should not be a surprise. Whether the analysis is framed in terms of government interest, centre of 
gravity or preferred result, the combination of any two of plaintiff, defendant and place of the tort 
is a good predictor of the choice of law selected by the court. The rule obviously cannot apply in the 
1-2-3 situation in which the plaintiff, defendant and place of the tort are located in three different 
countries. In that event, the choice of forum by the plaintiff can be considered to achieve a 2 out of
4 result or, a predetermined rule such as lex loci delicti can be applied, as for example, with the 
Restatement Second.
°[1971] A C  356 [hereinafter Boys].
^Castel, Conflict of Lam : Cases, Notes and Materials, 6th ed. (Butterworth’s: Toronto, 1988) at 12-39 
summarizes the reasons of the House as follows:
To sum up, three of the five Lords overruled Machado v. Fontes (Lord Hodson, Lord Guest,
Lord Wilberforce) and held that Phillips v. Eyre was a double actionability rule. Only two 
of them favoured the proper law of the torts doctrine (Lord Hodson and Lord Wilberforce).
The others rejected it. Lord Donovan and Lord Pearson would retain Machado v. Fontes.
Four of them held that the question before the court was one of substance and not 
procedure.
rule of double civil actionability with a limited exception permiting application of 
the law of the country with the most significant relationship to a particular 
issue.25 It will be recalled that, under the Phillips j  Machado rule for choice of 
law, the applicable substantive law was that of the forum, subject to the condition 
of non-justifiability by the law of the place where the tort occurred. The new rule 
continued the dominant role of the substantive law of the forum subject to the 
condition that actionability exist by the law of the place where the tort occurred.26 
In other words, Machado was overruled.
In Canada, direct impetus for reconsideration of the choice of law rule in torts 
came with enactment of Québec’s no-fault motor vehicle insurance scheme.27 
This scheme abolished a civil cause of action for damages arising from a motor 
vehicle accident in that province. The result was that a plaintiff bringing an action 
in his or her home province for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident in 
Québec could not satisfy the double civil actionability rule of Phillips (“not 
justifiable”) and had to rely on the Machado gloss (“not innocent”). Given 
developments in the United States, and the House of Lords decision in Boys, 
judges, particularly in Ontario, began the process of deconstructing McLean.
What is clear is that a majority of the House of Lords upheld the validity of the rule in 
Phillips v. Eyre. As well, a majority of the House overruled Machado v. Fontes and held that 
the rule in PhiUips v. Eyre was a rule requiring dual actionability. A majority of the House 
also held that the question before the House was one of substance and not procedure.
As stated above, the issue before the court in Boys was whether general damages were recoverable. 
This was treated by some of the Lords as equivalent to whether general damages were actionable 
under the law of the forum (England) - Yes - and under the law of the place of the tort (Malta) - No. 
Double civil actionability did not exist. In this context, Lord Wilberforce recognized a limited 
exception to the double actionability rule. He determined that Malta had no interest in applying its 
law to an English plaintiff against an English defendant and excluded Maltese law in favour of the 
application of English law. It is significant that Maltese law was excluded because it was a 
disinterested state.
^Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 11th ed. (London: Stevens, 1987) at 1365-66, has been 
accepted as a proper statement of the case:
Rule 205(1) As a general rule, an act done in a foreign country is a tort and actionable as 
such in England only if it is both (a) actionable as a tort according to English law, or in 
other words is an act which, if done in England would be a tort; and (b) actionable 
according to the law of the foreign country where it was done.
(2) But a particular issue between the parties may be governed by the law of the country 
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship with the occurrence 
and the parties.
26This view was confirmed by the English Court of Appeal decision in Coupland v. Arabian Gulf Oil 
Co. (1983) 1 W.L.R. 1151 (GA.). The plaintiff was a Scotsman employed by the defendant Libyan 
Company to work in Libya and was injured in Libya during the course of his employment.
T>Automobile Insurance Act, S.Q. 1977, c. 68; R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-25.
In Ontario, a series of cases in the early 1980s applied the Machado gloss to 
permit recovery by Ontario plaintiffs for injuries sustained in motor vehicle 
accidents in Québec.28 In 1989, an appropriate case for reconsideration of the 
rule reached the Ontario Court of Appeal. As with most of the earlier cases, 
Grimes v. Cloutier79 arose as a result of a motor vehicle accident in Québec 
involving Ontario plaintiffs and Québec defendants. Under the law of Québec, the 
defendants were not civilly liable due to Québec’s no-fault insurance regime, while 
under the law of Ontario the defendants would be civilly liable. If the Court 
applied McLean, the substantive law of Ontario would have been applicable. This 
was because the defendant driver had been convicted of driving without due care 
and attention and, therefore, the act was “not innocent” under the law of Québec. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal, per Morden JA., concluded that the Supreme 
Court did not intend to establish a universally applicable choice of law rule and 
limited McLean to its specific fact pattern. Morden JA. stressed that the McLean 
rule had been prefaced by the phrase “under these conditions”. Having 
distinguished McLean, Morden JA. rejected the application of the “not innocent” 
Machado gloss, in favour of a rule of double civil actionability per Phillips and 
Boys. As there was no civil cause of action under the law of the place where the 
tort occurred — Québec — the rule was not satisfied. Morden JA. reproduced with 
apparent approval the rule from Dicey & Morris as a general statement of his 
approach.30
In New Brunswick, there was also some dissatisfaction with the McLean 
approach to choice of law. In Martin v. McNeefy, Stevenson J. applied the most 
significant relationship approach.31 In McCutcheon v. McCutcheon and Pitre,32 
Higgins J. adopted an identical earlier version of the Dicey & Morris rule to apply
28Going v. Read Bros. Motor Sales Ltd. (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 201 (H.G); Guerin v. Proubt et al (1982), 
37 O.R. (2d) 558 (Co. Ct.); Eades v. Hamilton. (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 307 (Dist. Ct.); and Ang v. Track 
(1986), 57 O.R. (2d) 300 (H.C). See also Bouchard v. J.L. Le Saux Liée. (1986), 11 C.P.C. (2d) 170 
(CA); and Lewis v. Leigh (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 324 (CA.).
^(1989), 69 O.R (2d) 641 [hereinafter GrimesJ.
^ n  a subsequent decision, Prefontaine Estate v. Frizzle (1990), 71 O.R. (2d) 385, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal per Griffiths J A  confirmed that (i) the bask choice of law rule in tort is found in Phillips, 
(ii) described Dicey & Morris Rule 205 as “authoritative” and (iii) stated:
Grimes v. Cloutier stands for the proposition that in deciding the choice of law to be 
applied in Ontario to a tort committed outside the province, generally the two rules of 
Phillips v. Eyre, as expanded by Dicey & Morris, should apply. The two rules, however, 
should not be applied where to do so would produce an “unfair and unsound” result.
The Court of Appeal held that the general rule of double civil actionability was not satisfied due to 
the lack of a civil action under Québec’s Automobile Insurance Act and that this result was not unfair.
31 (1975), 10 N.B.R. (2d) 473 at 509 (Q.B.), rov’d (1976), 12 N.B.R (2d) 665 (C A ).
^(1989), 102 N.B.R. (2d) 271 (Q.B.).
Georgia law to an issue of compensation between Georgia residents for injuries 
sustained in a motor vehicle accident in New Brunswick. For the most part, 
however, New Brunswick cases reflect the traditional approach.33
Jensen v. Tolofson and Lucas v. Gagpon
Tolofson arose as a result of a motor vehicle accident in Saskatchewan involving 
vehicles from British Columbia and Saskatchewan. The plaintiff, a then 12 year 
old passenger in the British Columbia vehicle, brought action in British Columbia 
against both the driver of that vehicle (his British Columbia father) and against the 
driver of the Saskatchewan vehicle. Similarly, Lucas concerned a motor vehicle 
accident in Québec involving vehicles from Ontario and Québec. The plaintiffs, 
a mother and her children who were passengers in the Ontario vehicle, brought 
action against the driver of that vehicle (their Ontario husband/father) and against 
the driver of the Québec vehicle. The plaintiffs’ action against the Québec driver 
was subsequently discontinued; however, a cross-claim by the Ontario driver 
against the Québec driver had been instituted and was not discontinued.34
In both Tolofson and Lucas, the respective plaintiffs sought to apply the 
substantive and procedural laws of the forum and to avoid the unfavourable laws 
of the place where the accidents occurred. In Tolofson, the plaintiff sought to 
avoid Saskatchewan’s gratuitous passenger law35 and its twelve month limitation 
period in favour of the ordinary negligence standard and longer limitation period 
of British Columbia, the action having been commenced eight years after the 
accident. In Lucasy the plaintiffs sought to avoid the liability and compensation 
limits of Québec’s no-fault regime in favour of Ontario’s negligence regime.
In Tolofson, the British Columbia Court of Appeal36 had considered itself 
bound by McLean given the identical fact patterns presented in the two cases — 
plaintiffs and defendants from the same country involved in tortious conduct in a 
second country. Cumming JA., for the Court, did not consider that the additional 
factor of a co-defendant from the locus delicti was sufficient to distinguish McLean. 
He also concluded that since the motor vehicle trip began and was intended to end 
in British Columbia, the application of the law of British Columbia “most closely
^See Martin v. Marmen (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 611 (CA.); Perron v. Parise (1983), 44 N.B.R. (2d) 409 
(Q.B.); Hyslop v. Trenholm (1983), 48 N.B.R. (2d) 357 (Q.B.).
^Both Tolofson and Lucas presented the Court with the third (1-2-2) and fourth (1-1-2) fact patterns 
identified supra note 22.
35Which denied recovery unless the defendant driver breached the “wilful or wanton misconduct” 
standard of care.
*(1992), 89 D.L.R. (4th) 129.
accords with the reasonable expectations of the parties”.37 Cumming JA. 
distinguished the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Grimes on the basis that 
both defendants in that case were from the locus delicti. He also offered the 
rationalization that a civil action might have been reasonably expected to have 
been commenced within the one year Saskatchewan limitation period so that the 
Saskatchewan defendant was not similarly situated to a defendant whose conduct 
was not actionable per se.
In Lucas,M the Ontario Court of Appeal applied McLean to the main action 
between the Ontario plaintiffs and defendant — again, an indistinguishable fact 
pattern — and Grimes to the action involving the cross-defendant from the locus 
delicti. The reasoning of Tamopolsky JA., like that of Morden JA. in Grimes, 
was a torturous exercise in distinguishing McLean on the basis of fact pattern 
differences. Bound by Mclean in the main action, Tarnopolsky JA. considered 
that justice demanded, and Grimes permitted, the cross-defendant to be held 
subject to Québec law for conduct not actionable by the law of Québec.39
Choice of Law in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals in both actions. In reasons for 
decision written by La Forest J., the Court declared a clear and simple choice of 
law rule -  lex loci delicti.
The logic of La Forest J. is unambiguously grounded in two concepts — 
territoriality and comity. Recognition of what he described as the “underlying 
reality” of the international legal order, that each country or “state has jurisdiction 
to make and apply law within its territorial limit”,40 leads him inexorably to the 
conclusion that the proper functioning of the international order and 
accommodation of the modern mobility of persons and wealth requires comity as 
a controlling principle. Comity, he defines, as “the deference and respect due by 
other states to the actions of a state legitimately taken within its territory”.41
71 Ibid. at 144. 
m(1992), 59 OA.C 174.
^Carthy JA. concurred in the result but through different reasoning. In his view, the cross-defendant, 
not being liable under the main action, could not be held liable under the Negligence Act, R .S.0.1990, 
c. N-l, s. 2 as a “tortfeasor who is, or would if sued have been, liable”. Blair JA. concurred with both 
Tamopolsky and Carthy JJA
wSupra note 1 at 625.
*xIbid. at 626, quoting Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savqye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 [hereinafter 
Morguard], in which La Forest J. quoted the definition of comity given by Gray J. of the United States 
Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 at 163-64 (1895); 16 S.Ct. 139 at 143, and approved 
by La Forest J. in Morguard at 1096:
Comity, in turn, logically leads to the selection of lex loci delicti as the appropriate 
choice of law rule. In other words, the logic is syllogistic and circular. 
Territoriality leads to comity which leads back to territoriality.
Why did La Forest J. choose this rule?
In his view, after Phillips v. Eyre, English courts departed from the realities of 
the international order in favour of a “positivistic rule-oriented approach that has 
since seriously inhibited the development of rational principles in this area”.42 
For La Forest J., Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre had stated a “general rule” which had 
been treated subsequently as both universal and statutory. That such an 
interpretation favoured application of the lex fori in an age of imperialism and 
eased the burden of proof of foreign law, served to demonstrate the narrowness 
of the approach in light of the decline of English imperialism, the present 
overriding importance of comity and the present ease of proof of foreign law 
thanks to modern methods of transportation and communication.43 More 
significantly, such a rule favoured forum shopping as plaintiffs’ sought a more 
favourable law.
The practical advantages of lex loci delicti identified by La Forest J., in 
addition to consistency with the territoriality and comity principles, are threefold: 
certainty; ease of application; and predictability. He did recognize that localizing 
the tort may be problematic in certain situations such as those involving conduct 
in one country and injury in another; but, as he said, that is not this case and, in 
any event, the place of harm may be used to localize the place of the tort.44
In words reminiscent of Willes J. in Phillips, La Forest J. prefaced his lex loci 
delicti rule with the phrase “at least as a general rule”.45 He recognized the 
jurisdictional limits of Canadian courts, in terms of the requirement of “a real and 
substantial connection” between the forum and the matter in litigation,46 and the
“Comity” in the legal sense is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one 
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition 
which one nation allows within its territoiy to the legislative, executive or judicial 
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are 
under the protection of its laws . . . .
A2Ibid.
43Supra note 1 at 629-30.
^See for example, Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393.
45Supra note 1 at 627.
^Referring to: Morguard, and Hunt v .T  AN, pic, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289.
general control device of jorum non conveniens.47 Thus, La Forest J. accepted 
a rare but possible exception to lex loci delicti in relation to truly international tort 
situations in which a court would have a discretion to apply the law of the forum 
“in certain circumstances” in order to avoid injustice. This reasoning is not 
developed and is mired in a consideration of the efficacy of the first branch of the 
Phillips rule (actionable according to the law of the forum) which he dismissed as 
more related to jurisdiction than choice of law. La Forest J. is satisfied to merely 
wonder if the actionable in the forum requirement is “really necessary”.48
La Forest J. Rejected any Exception Within Canada.49
His analysis repeats much of the essential elements of his analysis of the 
international level — particularly, favouring certainty. Most of his attention is 
devoted to the troublesome fact pattern actually before him -  both plaintiffs and 
defendants are from the forum and were involved in allegedly tortious conduct in 
another province. Does justice not require an exception in relation to this fact 
pattern? La Forest J. answers with a firm, but at times hesitant, “no”. Agreeing 
with Lord Wilberforce in Boys, he rejects the American revolution in choice of law 
because of the uncertainty that a doctrine of the proper law of the tort would 
create. Quite remarkably, La Forest J. bolstered this conclusion by reference to 
a 1962 decision of the United States Supreme Court for the statement that the 
majority of American states “still apply the law of the place of the injury”.50 
Compared with the statistics presented above, this statement is patently in error 
and its vintage should have aroused some suspicion in so learned a Justice as La 
Forest J.
Having firmly, but falsely, established lex loci delicti as the predominant 
American approach, and having rejected the proper law of the tort, La Forest J. 
tackled the arguments in favour of an exception for the problematic fact pattern 
on three bases: fairness and public policy considerations; convenience; and 
reasonable expectation of the parties. Regarding fairness considerations, La 
Forest J. concluded that an exception to lex loci delicti was developed by courts 
which did not like the law of the place of the tort -  it was considered unfair or 
against public policy either because it denied recovery (McLean -  gratuitous 
passenger law) or denied full compensation (Boys -  limited to special damages). 
Rejection of the lex loci delicti in such situations required the court to deny the 
territoriality principle and favoured visitors over those who live in the locus delicti.
*7Scc: Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897.
48Supra note 1 at 631.
49In brief concurring reasons, Sopinka and Major JJ. “would not foreclose the possibility” of an 
exception to the lex loci delicti rule in relation to intra-Canada inteijurisdictional torts, ibid., at 648.
xRichards v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 585 (1962), 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
Such analysis may have been considered to accord with a court’s sense of fairness, 
but, for La Forest J., “order comes first”.51 Fairness coupled with the 
territoriality principle logically implies that a “fortunate” plaintiff, injured in the 
locus delicti by a fellow resident of the forum, should not be advantaged over a 
plaintiff injured by a resident of the locus delicti.52
For La Forest J., the convenience rationale is minimized within Canada by the 
similarity of substantive law, at least in the common law jurisdictions, and the 
ready access through law reports, online services and the availability of lawyers in 
Canada who maintain memberships in more than one Bar. Finally, the reasonable 
expectation of the parties rationale is simply rejected by La Forest J. who 
intuitively accepts that parties involved in a motor vehicle accident in another 
province reasonably expect the law of that province to govern their rights and 
liabilities.
La Forest J. identifies two fundamental benefits in favour of a strict rule. First 
it promotes judicial efficiency by preventing plaintiffs from seeking to fit an 
exception to the lex loci delicti rule through frivolous cross-claims; second, it 
promotes settlements due to the certainty of the rule. If there is to be an 
exception to the rule, La Forest J. prefers a legislative rather than judicial creation 
notwithstanding that he is considering common law choice of law rules.53 His 
main reason for this stance is the federalism factor.
Under the heading “Federal Problems”, La Forest J. reaffirms his commitment 
to the implicit “full faith and credit” constitutional imperative developed in
51Supra note 1 at 633.
52La Forest J. further rejects rationalizations for an exception based on protection of the health care 
and insurance systems of the forum for its residents injured in another province. These 
“considerations would ‘come out in the wash’” (See ibid. at 634) on a global analysis and are lessened 
by the existence of a national health care system funded in part by federal transfer payments.
°La Forest J. noted in passing article 3126 of the Civil Code of Québec S.Q. 1991, c. 64 which 
expressly provides an exception from the general lex loci delicti rule:
3126. The obligation to make reparation for injury caused to another is governed by the law 
of the country where the injurious act occurred. However, if the injury appeared in another 
country, the law of the latter country is applicable if the person who committed the injurious 
act should have foreseen that the damage would occur.
In any case where the person who committed the injurious act and the victim have their 
domiciles or residences in the same country, the law of that country applies.
He also referred to the similar exception contained in the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Traffic Accidents (1971) (ratified by nine European countries). The Convention was dismissed as 
a precedent founded on international sovereignty and judicial convenience, both of which factors were 
considered not significant within Canada.
Morguard. The source of this imperative rests in a narrow vision of Canadian 
federalism analogized to the American and Australian models, both of which 
expressly contain full faith and credit clauses in their respective constitutions. For 
La Forest J., and the Supreme Court majority, a federal state necessarily implies 
that substantive rights and liabilities should not vary depending on the province of 
litigation. This naturally favours the certainty of the lex loci delicti rule. Yet, the 
“universal” solution is one of the principal theoretical reasons for a system of 
private international law. What added dimension does federalism contribute? La 
Forest J. does not develop his thesis. Instead, he shifts focus to the constitutional 
source of provincial conflicts rules jurisdiction, “Property and Civil Rights in the 
Province”54 and declares a preference for a rule that clearly respects the 
territoriality principle inherent in that head of power rather than embarking upon 
the shallow waters of “intractable constitutional problems”.55 In his view, “an 
extensive concept of ‘proper law of the tort’ might well give rise to constitutional 
difficulties”.56
The New Choice of Law Rule
Certainty and simplicity have triumphed in Canadian conflict of laws. Having lex 
loci delicti as the strict choice of law rule for intra-Canadian multi-jurisdictional 
torts -  but with a rare exception in relation to international torts -  simplifies the 
judicial task and will promote settlements, reduce transaction costs57 and promote 
efficiencies within the legal system. However, one would be foolish to believe that 
the final word has been written by the Supreme Court on choice of law in torts.
54Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3., s. 92(13).
55Tolofson, supra note 1 at 639. 
x lbid.:
[A]n attempt by one province to impose liability for negligence in respect of activities that 
have taken place wholly in another province by residents of the latter or, for that matter, 
residents of a third province, would give rise to serious constitutional concerns. Such 
legislation applying solely to the forum province’s residents would appear to have more 
promise. However, it is arguable that it is not constitutionally permissible for both the 
province where certain activities took place and the province of residence of the parties to 
deal with civil liability arising out of the same activities. Assuming both provinces have 
legislative power in such circumstances, this would open the possibility of conflicting rules 
in respect of the same incident.
^R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1992) at 587- 
88. Judge Posner favours application of the law of the state with the comparative regulatory 
advantage in relation to particular issues. As with other approaches, he would apply the law of the 
place of the tort to locate specific factors such as traffic regulation and, if a state of common residence 
of plaintiff and defendant, the law of that state to govern standard of care and compensation.
The rule itself remains subject to the very criticisms which led American 
writers to formulate new approaches to choice of law. The troublesome fact 
pattern of plaintiffs and defendants from the forum province litigating tortious 
conduct in a second province will not go away. The basic question remains -  what 
interest does a province have in applying its substantive law to issues of liability 
and compensation between non-resident plaintiffs and defendants litigating in their 
home forum? Phrased another way, did the legislature intend its law to apply in 
such a situation? Did the legislature contemplate such a situation? It is clear that 
the Supreme Court in Lucas clearly held that the Québec legislature intended its 
no-fault scheme to apply to all motor vehicle accidents in Québec, but is that true 
for all tortious conduct to be governed by the strict lex loci delicti rule? Might not 
a court read down a substantive rule so that it would not apply to the non-resident 
parties? There is some precedent for this approach outside of the proper law 
approaches. In Bemkrant v. Fowler,58 a California court refused to apply the 
California Statute of Frauds to an oral Nevada contract on the ground that it did 
not apply to out-of-state contracts. A similar reading is possible in tort areas.
One should expect that eventually an exception to the strict lex loci delicti rule 
will be recognized. In Tolofson and Lucas itself, two of the seven justices made 
their concurrence with the majority subject to the possibility of an exception to the 
strictness of the rule. As noted by La Forest J., the 1971 Hague Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents adopts the lex loci delicti rule, but subject to 
displacement in favour of the law of the country of vehicle registration when there 
is a one vehicle accident or when the two vehicles are registered in a country other 
than the locus delicti. La Forest J. rejected the precedential weight of this 
Convention because of its inherent respect of national sovereignty and the factor 
of judicial convenience, both of which he disregards in relation to an intra- 
Canadian rule. Further weight favouring an exception may be found in the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement Second which, as noted above, applies a 
combination of a number of approaches to achieve lex loci delicti, but subject to 
displacement in relation to any issue by the law of the state with the most 
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. The Australian Law 
Reform Commission, in 1992, recommended lex loci delicti as the general choice 
of law rule subject to displacement “if the parties and the occurrence had an 
insignificant connection with that country and the law of another country had a 
real and substantial connection with the occurrence and with the parties”.39 
While the recommended rule is to apply to both intra-national and international 
torts, it is significant that the Commission recommended analysis of the purposes 
or objects of the law (a form of interest analysis) for interstate daims.60 The
58360 P.2d 906 (1961).
59The Law Reform Commission, Report No. 5& Choice of Law (1992) at 49.
*°Ibid., Draft Bill at 175.
Swiss Statute on Private International Law, which entered into force in 1989, 
similarly provides for the application of the lex loci delicti when the tortfeasor and 
injured party have no habitual residence in the same state, with displacement in 
favour of the law of the state of common habitual residence or, if selected by the 
parties, the law of the forum.61 The trend is becoming clear.62
If there are any doubts about the trend in choice of law in torts, such doubts 
will surely be dispelled by developments in the United Kingdom. Based on a 1990 
Report of the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission,63 a 
government bill is presently before the British Parliament to substitute, for the 
common law choice of law rule in tort, a general rule of lex loci delicti subject to 
displacement in favour of the law of another country which is substantially more 
appropriate in light of the significance of the factors connecting the tort with that 
country.64
It is clear that this trend will eventually come to Canada, if not by judicial 
action, then by legislative intervention. But why wait? The time for legislation is 
now.
Must lawyers return to the former days of arguing where a tort occurred? Do 
the various theories have to be resurrected as the focus of argument -  place of 
acting, place of harm, last act?65 The practice in other reforming jurisdictions, 
as for example the Bill before the British Parliament, is to particularize tort 
localization rules. An additional concern relates to compensation limitations. 
Recognizing the general conflicts rule that heads of damage are substantive and 
quantification of damages are procedural, must lawyers now argue over the 
characterization of statutory compensation limits under, for example, Québec and 
Ontario no-fault insurance schemes?66 A recent decision in Australia held that 
such statutory compensation limitations are procedural.67 The better view in 
Canada, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s discussion in Tolofson
61 Switzerland; Statute on Private International Law (1990) 29 I.L.M. 1244 at article 132 et seq.
62See, for example, G A L  Droz, “Cours général de droit international privé”, [1991] IV Recueil des 
Cours 9 at 282 et seq.
6aThe Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law 
in Tort and Delict (London: H.M.S.O., 1990)
64Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, (London: H.M.S.O., 1 March 1995) (HL 
Bill 39).
^See discussion of various theories in Moran, supra note 44.
64Automobile Insurance Act, supra, note 27 ; Insurance Act, R .S.0.1990, c. 1-8 as am. by S .0 .1993, c.
10.
^Kontis v. Barlin (1993), 115 A.C.T.R. 11 applying Stevens v. Head (1993), 112 A.L.R. 7 (H.C).
regarding limitations of actions, is that such limitations are substantive.68 Beyond 
the issue of characterization of compensation limits, it must be recognized that 
pro-plaintiff, pro-recovery trial judges may now be more receptive to 
substantive/procedural characterization arguments in order to avoid application 
of the substantive law of the locus delicti.
If legislation is to come, should it be federal or provincial?
As noted by La Forest J., in passing, there is the possibility of federal 
legislative intervention in Canadian Conflict of Laws. The notion of federal 
legislation regarding interprovincial enforcement of judgments certainly occurred 
to all who read Morguard. In the commercial area, such legislation could be 
supported as a matter within federal jurisdiction in relation to interprovincial and 
international trade and commerce. In other areas, such as personal injury, it is 
arguable whether purported federal jurisdiction — for example, as a matter of 
national concern under POGG, could escape a constitutional challenge.60 Similar 
reasoning could apply to choice of law rules. Choice of law in contract is an 
obvious illustration of interprovincial and international trade. Yet, rules in tort are 
harder to justify.
On the provincial level, conflict of laws legislation is not unusual. Yet, judicial 
consideration of such legislation is essentially unknown in Canada. The seeds for 
such review have been planted by La Forest J. in Morguard, Hunt T & N, pic, 
Amchem, and now Tolofson, cases in which he expounds on the concepts of “full 
faith and credit” and “real and substantial connection” to potentially justify and 
limit provincial jurisdiction under the Constitution Act, 1867. But, this analysis has 
been preliminary. The opportunity for real consideration of such issues by the 
Court has not yet been presented. In Tolofson, La Forest J. considered the 
compatibility of an exception to the lex loci delicti rule with provincial jurisdiction 
under “Property and Civil Rights in the Province” and suggests, as discussed 
above, that:
an extensive concept of “proper law of the tort” might well give rise to 
constitutional difficulties ... [and] it is arguable that it is not constitutionally permissible for both the province where certain activities took place and the 
province of the residence of the parties to deal with civil liability arising out of the 
same activities. Assuming both provinces have legislative power in such
6&The Court approved an approach to characterization by which the laws of the lex causae are, prima 
facie, characterized as substantive. See: Block Bros. Realty Ltd. v. Mollard (1981), 122 D.L.R. (3d) 323
(B.CCA.).
^Consider application of the “provincial inability” test per/?, v. Crown ZeUerbach Canada Ltd., [1988]
1 S.C.R. 401.
circumstances, this would open the possibility of conflicting rules in respect of the
same incident.70
It is clear that La Forest J. is not concerned in this passage with local sense 
jurisdictional issues, but rather with substantive law. The implication is that, as a 
“civil right in the province”, the lex loci delicti may attach immutably to the civil 
right created by tortious conduct in the locus delicti. Again, it is his vision of 
federalism which leads to this implication. The classic cases dealing with the “in 
the province” limitation, e.g. Royal Bank of Canada v. The King,71 Ladore v. 
Bennett,72 and Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp. v. Attorney-General for 
Newfoundland,73 were all concerned with ex post facto legislative changes to 
contracts localized outside of the province and with contractual parties outside of 
the province. It is not inconceivable that a court would characterize a provincial 
law governing a cause of action between resident plaintiffs and defendants for 
conduct which occurred outside of the province as, in pith and substance, a matter 
of property and civil rights in the province. Both Ladore and Churchill Falls 
accepted the distinction between legislation in relation to a property and civil 
rights in the province and legislation which incidentally affects property and civil 
rights outside the province. After all, notwithstanding that a civil right is created 
by the lex loci delicti, it does not follow that the right remains permanently 
localized in that province for constitutional purposes. In Ladore, it was held that 
a contract was located where the debtor was located; in Churchill Falls, the 
contract was located in Québec because of the rule that a contract is located 
where an action can be brought. A tort right is not necessarily static. Note, for 
example, that the Ontario statutory benefits automobile insurance scheme provides 
that an owner, occupant or person present at an accident scene is not liable in 
Ontario for loss or damage arising from an accident anywhere in Canada, the 
United States or a designated country.74 In other words, the civil right created 
by the law of another Canadian province is not enforceable in Ontario; it has been 
supplanted by an insurance scheme.
A final word. For those uncomfortable with Conflicts issues, the certainty and 
simplicity of lex loci delicti is no doubt welcome. For those who enjoy Conflicts 
issues, that very certainty and simplicity takes away part of the intellectual 
challenge. Gone, at least temporarily, are the fine points of dépeçage and interest 
analysis. One more challenge to the human spirit deflated.
70Supra note 1 at .
71 [1913] A C  283 (J.C.P.C.)
^[1939] AC. 468 (J.GP.G) [hereinafter Ladore].
” [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297 [hereinafter Churchill Falls].
^Insurance Act, supra note 66 at s. 267.1(1).
